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Social Protection for the Informal Sector: The Role of Minimum Wage 
and Income Transfer Policies  
 
 
Abstract1  
The objective of this study is to examine the impact that changes in minimum 
wage and the main income transfer programs have had on the economic 
participation of the population and the informal sector in Argentina.  The 
magnitude and importance that both policies have had in the Argentine case 
makes it possible carry out an in-depth analysis of these topics.  In effect, 
minimum wage was periodically modified between 2002 and 2014 to be 
among the highest in the Latin American region while the mentioned income 
transfer program – called the Universal Child Allowance – has benefited some 
40 percent of children residing in the country since its implementation. 
 
The obtained evidence suggests that modifications to minimum wage did not 
produce adverse effects on employment or have a substantial impact on the 
probabilities of entering the informal sector. Regarding the income transfers, it 
was possible to confirm that it did not encourage adults in beneficiary 
households to become economically inactive.  
 
JEL: J2, J4, J6  
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1 Introduction   
 
This study focuses on an analysis of the minimum wage policy and the main 
income transfer program – called the Universal Child Allowance (UCA)2– in 
Argentina.  
 
It will provide evidence about the impact these measures had on the labour 
market with a focus on the informal sector. It sought to determine – on the one 
hand – whether modifications in minimum wage reduced demand for 
employment and/or encouraged informality in the labour sector. On the other 
hand, it examined the influence of UCA as determining factors that leads the 
adult population in beneficiary households to leave or enter the work force. 
Similarly, the study assessed whether the transfers constitute an incentive for 
labour informality.  
 
In recent years, the use of minimum wage and income transfer programs has 
intensified in several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.  Argentina 
is a paradigmatic case as it brings together both phenomena. 
 
The minimum wage was repeatedly modified between 2002 and 2014 – on 24 
occasions. Its nominal amount increased 10-fold between 2003 and 2014 while 
its purchasing power practically tripled (see Chart 1). For its part, the UCA in 
place since 2009 currently benefits around 40 percent of children.  
 
Both measures are core aspects of income policy in Argentina and given their 
extension and coverage, contribute to the configuration of the new social 
protection system that appears to be emerging in Argentina. Together with 
their growing role in the agenda of Latin American public policies, both 
initiatives are surrounded by elevated controversy.  
 
 
The high level of informality that characterizes Latin American labour markets 
adds to the debate. The high proportion of people who have jobs that are not 
formal – which is to say they are not declared or registered in official social 
security records – raise further questions about the impact that establishing a 
legal minimum wage can have on that labour market segment. Therefore, it is 
important to investigate whether increases in minimum wage – which by 
definition only impact workers in formal jobs in the economy – cause any 
slippage in the salaries of informal workers. It is also important to investigate 
                                                          
2 In Argentina the Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection (hereafter Universal Child Allowance or 
UCA) was created through Decree 1.602/09 toward the end of 2009. The decree modified the Family 
Allowance Law (Law 24.714), expanding its benefits to include children whose parents are unemployed or 
who work in the informal sector with salaries that are below minimum, vital and mobile wage. The UCA is a 
monthly cash benefit that is paid to parents, tutors, guardians or blood relatives up to the third degree, for 
each child under 18 who is their responsibility, up to a maximum of five children. There is no age limit when 
the child is disabled.  
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whether changes in this labour mechanism lead to transitions between both 
segments of workers: from the formal to the informal sector and vice versa.  
 
Similarly, the possible contractionary impact of social policies on labour supply 
has been a recurring concern in specialized literature.  It has been suggested 
that income transfer programs encourage beneficiaries to moderate or even 
stop their search for work. A narrowing – or closure – of the income gap 
between inactivity/unemployment/informality and having a job is a central 
part of our research.  
 
2 Revision of the Literature 
 
2.1 Regarding Minimum Wage 
 
Classic labour market models suggest that establishing a wage floor above the 
equilibrium wage – understood as that which clears any excess labour supply – 
will lead to a reduction in the volume of employment.  
 
Part of the empirical research carried out in the 1980s, for the most part based 
on the U.S. economy, provided evidence that supports this vision (Gallasch, 
1975; Gardner, 1981 y Brown et al., 1982). The reigning consensus at the time 
was largely based on the thought of Brown et al. (1982) who concluded that 
the reduction in employment among young people would be between 1 
percent and 3 percent as a result of a 10 percent increase in minimum wage 
in the United States.  
 
Throughout the 1990s, a growing body of work questions this mainstream view, 
demonstrating that the impact could be null – or in any case negative but with 
little economic significance.  (Lawrence, Katz y Krueger, 1992; Card y Krueger, 
1995; Dickens, Machin and Manning, 1999).  
 
During the current century the debate has grown more intense based on 
research that offers finds contradictory results and is not lacking 
methodological controversy (Neumark y Wascher, 2006; Dube, Lester y Reich, 
2010; Allegretto, Dube y Reich, 2011 and Lemieux, 2011)3.  
 
The debate has intensified in economies with segmented labour markets. In 
effect, if we accept that there are different segments of workers, the 
imposition of a specific level in the minimum wage could impact them in 
                                                          
3 The theoretic operating models of alternative labour market models to the competitive model that justify 
the absence of contractionary effects on employment are monopsonistic. In these markets the equilibrium 
wage is lower than the value of the marginal productivity of labour. As a result, an increase in minimum 
wage does not necessarily lead to a reduction in employment. Under this hypothesis, the impact of 
increases in minimum wage are indeterminate (Manning 2003). From a slightly different perspective, the 
theory of efficient salaries admits that salary increases can increase productivity and therefore, they also do 
not lead to a reduction in employment (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990).  
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different manners.4 The analysis of the impact of minimum wage on 
segmented labour markets recognizes Welch (1974); Gramlich (1976) and 
Mincer (1976 and 1984) as offering the most relevant contributions.  
 
Recently there has been a renewed stream of research that has concentrated 
on the situation of countries in the Latin America region where the level of 
informality is very high. Comparative studies have been done between 
countries (Cunningham, 2007; Marinakis y Velasco, 2006; Maloney y Nuñez 
Méndez, 2004) and of course research centered on national cases has also 
proliferated: Brazil (Boeri et al, 2011; Lemos, 2009 y 2004;  Neumark et al., 2006; 
Carneiro y Corseuil, 2001; Fajnzylber, 2001); Peru (Céspedes, 2006); México 
(Bosch y Manacorda, 2010; Cunningham y Siga, 2006 –y Brazil–); Chile (Infante 
et al., 2003); Colombia (Arango y Pachón, 2004), Costa Rica (Gindling y Terrell, 
2007); Honduras (Gindling y Terrell, 2009 y 2010); Trinidad and Tobago (Strobl y 
Walsh, 2001) y Nicaragua (Alaniz et al, 2011). For the Argentinian case we can 
mention Marshall (2006) and Khamis (2008).  
 
In international literature, the impact of minimum wage on the salary structure 
has also been profoundly analysed. On this front, there is a certain level of 
agreement in recognizing that the salary distribution tends to compress when 
there are increases in minimum wage (DiNardo et al, 1996; Autor et al, 2010) 
although some studies emphasize that increases in the lowest remunerations 
are greater in the informal sector than in the informal. (Lemos, 2009; Boeri et al, 
2011).  
 
2.2 Regarding conditional income transfers 
 
Social protection systems based on non-contributory schemes to ensure basic 
protection for vulnerable populations have grown substantially in the Latin 
America region in recent years (Barrientos and Hulme, 2009). In 2001 these 
plans reached 38 million beneficiaries, but by 2010 this number had grown to 
129 million (Stampini and Tornarolli, 2012). Generally, they are associated with 
conditions related to education, health and nutrition, usually aimed at children 
in the household in a bid to stop the inter-generational transmission of poverty. 
(Villatoro, 2007).5  
 
The multiplication of these programs has recently opened a broad debate 
about the possible impact on the labour market that dates back many years. 
                                                          
4 Hall (1982) detected that minimum wage increased a labour rotation among job positions; Tauchen (1981) 
and Welch (1974) discovered that it led to the migration of workers from sectors covered by minimum wage 
to others that are not covered. Cotterman (1981), Fleisher (1981), Hammermesh (1981) demonstrated that it 
reduces employment in low salary sectors and Beranek (1982) indicated that it created an incentive to 
contract illegal immigrants.  
5 The  most important programs in the Latin America region, regarding the number of beneficiaries are:  
Brasil (Bolsa Familia), México (Oportunidades) y Argentina (Asignación Universal por Hijo).  
Similar programs with slightly less coverage can be found in several countries in the region: “Avancemos” 
(Costa Rica); “Familias en Acción” (Colombia); “Chile Solidario” (Chile); “Programa de Asignación Familiar” 
(Honduras); “Red de Protección Social” (Nicaragua); “Red de Oportunidades” (Panamá) y “Programa 
Juntos” (Perú), among others. 
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In effect, the classical perspective saw them as policies that encourage 
inactivity6 while more heterodox visions sustain that they could lead to an 
increase in the economic participation in certain population groups.  
Moreover, some would argue that programs that seek to equalize the rights of 
informal workers with formal workers – in terms of the access the second group 
has to certain levels of social protection – generate incentives for labour 
informality (Levy, 2008).  
 
3 Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Characteristics of the data source 
 
The data used in the study comes from the Permanent Household Survey – EPH 
– which is carried out by the National Institute of Statistics and Census – INDEC.   
Argentina does not have panel surveys but the information coming from EPH 
makes it possible to obtain data of this nature. The survey does not directly 
investigate changes in the variables over time but it is possible to construct 
longitudinal data.  
The EPH micro databases were used for the period that goes from 2004 to 
2013.  
 
When examining minimum wage changes, we turned to the creation of 
annual panels corresponding to the second quarters for the biennia in the 
period.7 Using the second quarters makes it possible to reasonably capture the 
modifications in the value of the minimum legal salary and facilitates an 
estimate of its impact on the labour status of individuals (see Chart 1). As a 
result, it is possible to observe the location of salaried workers regarding legal 
minimum wage prior to its modification and one year later, which is to say 
when the change in the value of minimum wage had taken place. –8. We 
then added the annual rotation groups in a single data base – pooled data 
sample. In the regression models we controlled the membership in each 
annual panel through the inclusion of a dummy variable.  
 
When exploring the effects of the income transfers, we used data from the 
panel of micro databases corresponding to the third and fourth quarters of 
2009 and 2010. The selection of these quarters is based on the moment when 
                                                          
6 A report written in England in 1834 about the so called “poor laws” is an eloquent example. In this, returning 
to the ideas of Malthus in his 1798 Essay on Population, it was maintained that social assistance is an 
incentive to not work.  
7 The data to be used corresponds to the total number of urban centres covered by the survey.  
8 The use of logistic models to estimate the impact of the variables of interest on changes in the labour status 
could be biased if there was a dependency on the initial situation. Due to the elevated level of informality 
and the high mobility between formality and informality in the Argentine case, this aspect was not 
problematic. In any case, the models were controlled using the CMP package from Stata module to 
implement conditional –recursive– mixed process estimator) that allows the inclusion of endogenous binary 
variables within a multinomial regression.  
7 
 
the income transfer program that is being analysed was implemented. The 
UCA took effect in late 2009 and therefore it is possible to identify beneficiary 
households in 2010, after the program came into effect in 2009 and trace 
them back a year when the UCA was still not in effect. Similar to the case of 
involving minimum wage, the rotation groups were added to a single 
database and in the regression models, membership in each annual panel 
was controlled through the inclusion of a dummy variable. The data to be 
used corresponded to the total of the urban centres that the EPH covers.  
 
3.2 Methodological Design 
 
The methodological design used in this investigation has two parts. In the first 
we turned to multinomial logistic regression models with data from the 
constructed panels.  Secondly we used the differences in differences focus – 
diff in diff – with similar multinomial logistic models but with cross-sectioned 
micro data from the same information source.9 
 
Multinomial logistic regression: Minimum wage 
The analysis universe was made up of salaried workers covered by regulations 
related to minimum wage in the initial period, which is to say, prior to its 
modification. Unless otherwise indicated, salaried workers were selected 
whose work weeks varied between 35 and 48 hours – taking into account that 
minimum wage is applied to salaried workers who meet the requirement of a 
legal working day.  
 
Similar to the scope of the norms on minimum wage, people in domestic 
service were excluded, as were the beneficiaries of employment plans. 
Moreover, the universe was restricted to consider salaried workers who were 
under the age of 60. This made it possible to concentrate attention on the 
economically active population and avoid transitions toward inactivity due to 
access to retirement benefits.  
 
The dependent variable was defined as the labour status of individuals after 
the modification of minimum wage. Four categories were defined.  
a) To be in a formal, salaried registered job 
b) To be in an informal job, salaried but not registered 
c)   To not be occupied – unemployed or inactive and 
c) To be occupied in a non-salaried position – this final group is the 
base category against which the parameters were estimated.  
 
 
                                                          
9 As is known, there could be a risk of attrition when panel data is used (which is to say if there was a decline 
in the number of cases with the required observations and this was not random). In the databases used for 
this research, the loss of registers was marginal (around 6 percent on average) and therefore did not justify 
the application of adjustments to address this issue.  
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The independent variable of interest is the one that captures the impact of 
perceiving remuneration that is below – or in the tranche of the legal minimum 
wage.10 The analysis is centred on the monthly salary received by workers in 
their main occupation, which is the relevant concept used to examine 
changes in the labour status of individuals.  
 
Through this model it was possible to evaluate if those people with salaries 
below – or in the tranche – of minimum wage were more exposed to losing 
their jobs, or to entering the informal sector in the case of formal salaried 
workers after a variation in minimum wage.  
 
The vector of independent variables was complete with the following: gender, 
age, age squared, educational level (characterized in the three levels), 
position in the household, size of the establishment, branch of activity and 
region of residence. Dummy variables were also included for each of the 
groups included in the data pool. 
   
Multinomial logistic regression: Income transfer 
Two models were defined11: in the first withdrawal from the labour market was 
tested on all those who were employed when the first interview was carried 
out. As a result, the dependent variable was defined in three categories.  
 
a) Unemployed; 
b) Inactive and 
c) Employed – as a base category. 
 
In the second model, similarly, it was evaluated whether people moved from 
inactivity to economic activity after receiving these income transfers.  In this 
case, the universe for analysis was made up of all those who were not 
employed nor were seeking employment when surveyed for the first 
observation. The dependent variable was defined in the following three 
categories.  
 
a) To be unemployed 
b) To be employed and 
                                                          
10 In this document a habitual practice from the specialized literature was followed and three income 
tranches were created based on the value of the minimum legal salary for each period: under, in the 
tranche and above the legal minimum.  
11 Given that the aim is to evaluate the impact of the perception of the AUH on the labour insertion of adults 
and considering that this program is granted only to families with parents who are unemployed or in the 
informal sector, it is convenient to control the possible existence of endogeneity that could bias the results. 
The presumed endogeneity is due to non-observed variables that could have an impact on the condition 
for which the households are beneficiaries – which is to say reasons why they have adults who are 
unemployed or in the informal sector and have children. Similar to the case of minimum wage, both models 
were control with the CMP Stata package (module to implement conditional – recursive – mixed process 
estimator) which allowed for the inclusion of endogenous binary variables within a multinomial regression. 
The obtained results confirmed the absence of endogeneity in this case as well.  
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c) To remain inactive – as a base category 
 
The analysis group was restricted to the group of homes with children and 
without members who were formally employed – which is to say salaried and 
registered in social security – between the third and fourth quarter of 2009 and 
2010. The vector of independent variables included the usual categories for 
this type of study: age; age squared, gender, educational level, position in the 
home and number of children. Moreover, controls were added for geographic 
regions and rotation groups. The independent variable of interest was defined 
as that which indicated if the home received subsidies or some social aid in 
cash.12 A dummy variable was defined which assumed the value of 1 if the 
individual resided in a home benefiting from these transfers or 0 in the opposite 
case. 
 
Differences in differences approach: Minimum wage 
The differences in differences approach was applied to the group of salaried 
workers, in two specific moments – before and after the change in the 
minimum wage. The treatment group was defined in two categories: salaried 
workers with remunerations below the legal minimum and workers with salaries 
in the tranche.  
 
On the other hand, the control group was made of up workers with 
remuneration above minimum wage. The method made it possible to confirm 
if the probabilities of entering an informal job were greater for salaried workers 
with remunerations below/in the tranche of minimum wages – compared with 
those whose wages are above the minimum – once minimum wage itself was 
modified.  
 
The analysis was carried out separately for each of the biennia in the 2004 to 
2013 period through logistic regressions. It was a cross sectional database for 
each biennia and included the observations corresponding to the universe 
indicated in the period before and after the modification of minimum wage.13  
In the vector of independent variables the same were included that were 
used in the multinomial models described above. The variables of interest 
were:  
 
a) Salaries under the minimum and the year following the modification 
of the minimum salary.  
b) Salaries in the tranche of the minimum and a year following the 
modification of the minimum salary.  
 
                                                          
12 The variable used is the “Categories of Non Laboral Income: Income by subsidy or social aid (in cash) from 
the government, Church, etc. (V5 M)”. A range of values was used to approximate the receptors of AUH. 
See: Design of Registry and Structure of the preliminary database of Households and Individuals. INDEC.  
13 The use of a cross sectioned data base for each biennia made it possible to have access to a greater 
number of cases and results than if the model had been applied to dynamic data. Moreover, in computing 
the double difference with independent databases the identification of the control group was more 
efficient.  
10 
 
Differences in differences approach: Income transfers 
In this case, the differences in differences approach was applied on the group 
of adult individuals belonging to homes with children where there is no 
registered salaried worker – which is to say only unemployed adults or those in 
the informal sector. It referred to two moments in time – the second quarter of 
each biennium between 2010 and 2013. The treatment group was defined by 
those adult members of beneficiary households while the control group was 
made up of adult individuals in households with children who lack members 
employed in formal work and declared they don’t receive income transfers. 
The method made it possible to confirm whether the probabilities of enjoying a 
determined labour status varied in time between beneficiary and non-
beneficiary households of UCA.   
4 Results  
4.1 Minimum wage  
 
Slightly less than a third of salaried workers in Argentina – considering jointly 
those workers whose remuneration is below minimum wage and those whose 
income is close to this level and with work weeks that vary between 35 and 48 
hours – constitute the universe that would be most exposed to changes in this 
salary level (see Chart 2). Note that the proportion is slightly more than 40 
percent when the impact is observed in the total number of employed.  
 
It is possible to verify that between 2004 and 2013 this number remained 
relatively stable after a significant change between 2004 and 2005. The 
marked increase of the fraction of salaried workers with remunerations below 
the legal minimum as of 2005 also corresponds to the notorious increase in its 
value. Between 2004 and 2005, minimum wage increased from 42.8 percent to 
52 percent compared with the average salary (see Chart 3).  
 
This panorama is slightly different regarding salaried workers registered in the 
social security system – formal workers – are considered separately from those 
who are not – informal.  
 
The relative stability in the structure of the recipients based on their location 
regarding minimum wage suggests that nominal increases between 2005 and 
2013 accompanied the variations in the remunerations of the global group of 
salaried workers. One direct way of measuring if this took place is by 
computing the coefficient between the minimum wage and different points in 
the distribution of salaries. It is possible to confirm that, after a significant 
increase in the value of minimum wage compared with average wage 
between 2004 and 2005, the increase of minimum wage – versus average 
remunerations – followed a more moderate tendency above 50 percent (see 
Chart 3).  
 
11 
 
The minimum wage essentially matched the average wage of the informal 
workers and more than surpassed that received by salaried workers in the first 
income decile. See Chart 3.  
 
This alludes to the fact that the Argentinian labour market is segmented and 
does not operate competitively.  Estimates based on Kernel density confirm 
this. Through its usage, it is possible to graphically represent the location of 
minimum wage in the distribution of remunerations for formal and informal 
workers. See Graph 1.14 It is possible to appreciate that, for the group of 
registered salaried workers, the minimum wage is located in the extreme lower 
end of the distribution, leaving only a small proportion of recipients under this 
threshold. For non-registered workers, minimum wage is located on the 
descending right high side of the density function. Unlike what happened for 
registered salaried workers, the magnitude of informal workers with salaries 
below the minimum was not marginal. Globally, this evidence justifies 
concluding that minimum wage does not constitute a salary floor for the 
informal sector in the style of a “beacon”, although it could have exercised it 
in dynamic terms as the salary gap between both segments did not increase.  
 
Graph 1: Kernel density estimation of wages for registered and non-registered workers and 
the location of minimum wage (2010).15 
 
 
 
 
Recurring to the pool of data, it was possible to estimate the proportion of 
those who maintained or changed their location in the salary tranches 
regarding the legal minimum before and after its modification (see Chart 4). It 
is possible to confirm that around one out of every 5 salaried workers (23.2 
percent) who in the initial year received wages below the legal minimum 
entered the segment of those who earned more than minimum wage in the 
following year. In contrast, 6.9 percent of those who had received salaries 
                                                          
14 For indicative purposes we have included the 2010 Kernel distribution. The same result is obtained for all 
the years in the 2004-2013 period.  
15 The vertical line indicates the location of minimum wage. In all cases the data comes from EPH. Estimates 
were made for the years 2004 to 2013.   
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above the minimum then moved into the group with salaries below the 
minimum one-year later.  
  
The estimated probabilities with the logistic multinomial regression models 
support the absence of significant negative impacts on the loss of 
employment among formal salaried workers. In effect, registered salaried 
workers with remunerations at or below the minimum tranche - who are more 
impacted by changes in the legal minimum - did not demonstrate greater 
probabilities of losing their condition as the employed, which is to say they did 
not demonstrate greater probability of entering unemployment or inactivity. 
The coefficients were not significant (see Chart 6).   
 
The panorama is slightly different when the analysis focuses on the impact 
regarding access to a non-registered job. A previously stated, registered 
salaried workers with an income that is below minimum wage and those with 
remunerations in the minimum wage tranche represented something less than 
6 percent to 8 percent respectively in 2013. They exhibited positive and 
significant probabilities of entering an informal position (0.74 in the first group 
and much less -0.44- in the second group.) This situational data is 
complemented by the fact that those registered salaried workers with 
remunerations below the minimum had less probabilities of remaining in this 
condition (-0.309). This panorama suggests that minimum wage had exercised 
an impact on the margin – light and with little economic significance - 
regarding the labour status of workers.  
 
Through a differences in differences analysis it is possible to  reinforce the 
conclusion obtained from the panel data about the limited impact that 
changes in minimum wage could have on the level of informality. 
 
4.2 Transfer of Income 
 
The impact of the UCA on the activity-inactivity trajectory was evaluated for 
those members of homes who are able to access the program. The regression 
models made it possible to confirm that the UCA was not associated with a 
greater probability of moving from employment to inactivity - the coefficient 
was not significant (see Chart 8).   
 
In other words, the perception of this transfer – controlled by the remainder of 
the factors included in the analysis – did not lead adult workers to exit 
economic activity. On the other hand, it did confirm a greater propensity to 
go from employment to unemployment. The interpretation of this derivation 
makes sense when we note that the jobs held by adults in these homes tend to 
be characterized by very low stability. Similar results were found in the 
separate analysis for men and women.  
 
In the other direction, in the move from inactivity toward unemployment and 
employment, it is possible to confirm that the monetary transfer had a positive 
13 
 
and significant sign (see Chart 8).  This is to say that they were associated with 
a greater probability of entering economic activity. In the separate analysis for 
men and women, it was confirmed that this would have occurred due to what 
happened with the first. This lends credence to the hypothesis about the 
predomination of certain cultural patterns that assigned men the role of 
breadwinner while women are assigned the role of taking care of the children 
and other domestic tasks.16 
 
The differences in differences analysis confirms the absence of positive effects 
on the probabilities of becoming inactive in two of the three analysed biennia 
(see Chart 9). In fact, it confirms a negative and significant effect in the 2012-
2013 period.  
5 Conclusions and policy implications 
 
In the current century, both the regulation of minimum wage and income 
transfer to poor homes have been consolidating in the Latin American region 
as fundamental tools for achieving basic or minimal social protection 
guarantees.  
 
The Argentina case stands out in this context due to the intense use of both 
policies, given the coverage that is reached and the amount assigned in each 
case.  Despite the recently described panorama, the persistence of a high 
level of labour informality amply justifies the development of the research in 
order to study the impact on the labour market and glean any policy 
implications.  
 
The application of minimum wages tends to provoke intense debate. While 
some literature emphasizes that it reduces employment and provokes and 
increase in inequality, other claim that it doesn’t have any negative impact on 
employment and also contributes to protecting the remuneration of less skilled 
workers. The question is further complicated by the possible impact it could 
have on labour informality.  
 
Evidence obtained in the Argentinian case revealed that throughout this 
period, somewhat less than a third of the total number of salaried workers, 
considering all workers who receive less than minimum wage or in the legal 
minimum tranche as one group, are exposed to the possible impact from the 
modification of its amount.   
 
For its part, econometric estimates demonstrated that the modifications of the 
minimum wage did not produce any negative impact on employment. 
Moreover, it is possible to emphasize that there also was no substantial impact 
on the probabilities of losing a formal job and entering the informal sector – the 
                                                          
16 It is worth emphasizing that this analysis is limited to one-year interval between observations. The question 
as to whether the impact could change over a greater time period remains open. (Galasso, 2006).  
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impact was modest and only involved a very small proportion of salaried 
workers. Finally, the information obtained in this research confirmed that the 
salary gap between formal and informal workers did not increase. 
 
Regarding the income transfers, the controversy has focused on the impact 
that the income transfer could have on the decisions to participate in the 
labour market. The results that were obtained demonstrate that there was no 
movement toward economic activity attributable to the UCA. To the contrary, 
some evidence was found that it could have encouraged a move to 
economic activity – from inactivity toward unemployment, of the men in the 
beneficiary homes.  
 
As a whole, this evidence manifests in favour of encouraging the continuity of 
these initiatives. Moreover, due to the positive impact – although modest – 
that was found regarding the economic activity in certain groups of the 
population concerning UCA, it would be worth asking about the impact that 
could be obtained if the application of this policy scheme were amplified.  
 
Finally, it is important to draw attention to the existing quota of informality in 
the Argentinian labour market as a distinctive element for the design of policy 
recommendations.  
 
As a result, the use of specific policies to achieved higher marks in the level of 
labour formalization that mitigate the loss of wellbeing derived from the 
disadvantages associated with informality emerges as corollary. This will result 
in a greater effectiveness of the analysed policies – ie greater coverage of 
minimum wage and greater available resources due to the reduction of 
informal workers – thereby contributing to achieving growing levels of equity 
and social integration.  
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List of Charts 
Chart 1. Modification of Minimum Wage 2003 – 2014 (In $ Argentine) 
Modification of Minimum Wage 2003 - 2014 
Norm In Place Since 
Salary by 
hour 
Salary by 
month 
Decree 388/03 December 1, 2003 1,5 300 
Decree 1349/03 
January 1,  
2004 
1,75 350 
Resolution 2 of the National 
Employment Council, Productivity and 
Minimum, Vital and Moveable Wage 
and Decree 1192/04 
September 1, 2004 2,25 450 
Resolution 2 of the National 
Employment Council, Productivity and 
Minimum, Vital and Moveable Wage 
and Decree 750/05 
May 1, 2005 2,55 510 
June 1, 2005 2,85 570 
July 1, 2005 3,15 630 
Resolution 2 of the National 
Employment Council, Productivity and 
Minimum, Vital and Moveable Wage 
(2006) 
August 1, 2006 3,8 760 
September 1, 2006 3,9 780 
November 1, 2006 4 800 
Resolution 2 of the National 
Employment Council, Productivity and 
Minimum, Vital and Moveable Wage 
(2007) 
August 1, 2007 4,5 900 
October 1, 2007 4,8 960 
December 1, 2007 4,9 980 
Resolution 2 of the National 
Employment Council, Productivity and 
Minimum, Vital and Moveable Wage 
(2008) 
August 1, 2008 6 1200 
December 1, 2008 6,2 1240 
Resolution 2 of the National 
Employment Council, Productivity and 
Minimum, Vital and Moveable Wage 
(2009) 
August 1, 2009 7 1400 
October 1, 2009 7,2 1440 
January 1, 2010 7,5 1500 
Resolution 2 of the National 
Employment Council, Productivity and 
Minimum, Vital and Moveable Wage 
(2010) 
August 1, 2010 8,7 1740 
January 1, 011 9,2 1840 
Resolution 2 of the National 
Employment Council, Productivity and 
Minimum, Vital and Moveable Wage 
(2011) 
August 1, 2011 11,5 2300 
Resolution 2 of the National 
Employment Council, Productivity and 
Minimum, Vital and Moveable Wage 
(2012) 
September 1, 2012 13,35 2670 
Feburary 1, 2013 14,38 2875 
Resolution 2 of the National 
Employment Council, Productivity and 
Minimum, Vital and Moveable Wage 
(2013) 
August 1, 2013 16,5 3300 
January  
1, 2014 
18 3600 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Chart 2. Distribution of employed individuals according to their level of salary 
versus the legal minimum  (%)(1)           
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total Employed  
Under 28,5 38,6 37,2 37,7 33,1 35,8 35,2 33,3 36,2 32,5 
In the tranche 16,4 9,1 7,4 7,2 9,7 8,5 10,8 12,7 6,8 10,1 
Above 55,2 52,3 55,3 55,1 57,2 55,7 54,0 54,0 57,0 57,4 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Occupied 35-48hs  
Under 12,7 22,7 22,5 24,1 21,8 22,7 22,7 21,5 22,4 19,1 
In the tranche 14,6 10,9 7,4 8,3 9,8 9,2 12,3 13,4 7,0 10,3 
Above 72,7 66,4 70,1 67,6 68,4 68,1 64,9 65,1 70,6 70,6 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Salaried 35-48hs  
Under 10,0 19,3 20,2 21,3 20,1 20,0 19,9 19,3 19,2 14,8 
In the tranche 14,7 11,1 7,1 8,2 9,7 9,9 12,6 12,1 6,9 10,3 
Above 75,3 69,6 72,7 70,5 70,2 70,1 67,5 68,6 73,9 74,9 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Salaried 35-48hs(2)  
Under 8,1 16,7 16,8 18,5 17,5 17,0 16,7 16,3 17,1 13,0 
In the tranche 13,6 10,8 7,2 8,3 9,5 9,9 12,6 12,0 6,7 9,9 
Above 78,3 72,6 76,0 73,2 73,0 73,1 70,7 71,7 76,2 77,1 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Registered Salaried 35-48hs(2)  
Under 1,8 5,7 6,3 7,9 8,5 8,3 8,3 7,9 7,9 5,9 
In the tranche 9,1 8,5 5,6 6,4 7,9 8,7 10,5 9,6 5,5 7,8 
Above 89,1 85,8 88,2 85,6 83,6 83,0 81,2 82,5 86,6 86,2 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Unregistered Salaried 35-48hs(2)   
Under 25,1 46,5 47,2 50,2 49,1 48,0 45,6 46,8 53,1 48,5 
In the tranche 25,6 16,9 11,8 13,8 15,1 14,2 19,9 20,7 11,5 12,2 
Above 49,3 36,7 41,1 36,0 35,8 37,8 34,6 32,4 35,5 39,3 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Self Employed  
Under 30,6 43,0 37,5 42,1 36,6 42,4 43,4 36,1 39,7 40,5 
In the tranche 16,3 10,7 9,9 9,2 12,0 6,6 12,5 21,9 8,5 10,2 
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Above 53,2 46,3 52,5 48,7 51,4 51,0 44,1 42,1 51,8 49,4 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
(1) Classification by ranges taking rounding into account 
(2) Excludes domestic service and employment plan beneficiaries 
Source: Our own elaboration based on data from the Permament Household Survey – EPH – 
INDEC, Second Quarter 
 
 
Chart 3. Ratio of minimum wage regarding different points of salary distribution based 
on registration. Salaried (35-48hs) (%)(1) 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Salaried  
Average 42,8 52,0 54,2 55,9 53,9 58,8 58,2 54,4 56,8 55,5 
Percentile 10 116,4 131,9 148,5 129,2 135,6 138,9 149,9 125,0 122,5 120,8 
Percentile 25 76,4 94,9 89,3 96,8 94,9 96,1 99,9 93,7 87,5 85,3 
Mid 53,8 65,0 66,1 64,6 63,3 69,4 71,4 62,5 64,5 64,4 
Percentile 75 35,0 43,2 44,6 48,4 47,5 48,8 50,0 46,9 49,0 47,5 
Registered Salaried   
Average 38,3 46,0 47,9 49,7 48,6 53,4 52,5 49,2 51,7 50,7 
Percentile 10 87,3 94,9 104,0 96,8 105,5 104,1 107,1 104,1 98,0 96,7 
Percentile 25 63,6 79,0 78,1 77,5 79,1 83,3 83,3 75,0 81,6 72,5 
Mid 48,2 59,3 62,4 59,6 59,3 62,5 60,0 58,6 61,2 58,0 
Percentile 75 35,0 39,6 41,6 43,0 41,3 43,1 42,9 41,7 44,5 41,4 
Unregistered Salaried Workers  
Average 61,9 80,7 87,6 89,0 87,7 91,6 93,1 88,0 92,5 84,8 
Percentile10 174,9 236,6 249,6 227,6 237,2 249,6 249,9 234,1 244,8 193,3 
Percentile 25 121,2 157,8 156,1 155,0 158,2 156,2 150,0 156,1 163,2 145,0 
Mid 87,3 98,9 104,1 107,5 105,5 104,1 107,1 104,1 122,4 96,6 
Percentile 75 58,2 67,9 78,1 77,4 75,9 78,1 75,0 75,0 76,5 72,5 
(1) Classification by ranges, taking rounding into account. It excludes domestic service and beneficiaries of 
employment plans 
Source: Our own elaboration based on data from the Permanent Household Survey – EPH – INDEC, Second 
quarter 
 
 
Chart 4: Annual transitions of salaried workers (35-48hs) according to the salary 
received compared with the legal minimum. Pool from the panel data 2004-2013 
(%) (1) 
 Location in t 
Location in t-1 
No longer 
salaried 
Under 
minimum 
In the 
tranche of 
Above 
minimum 
Total 
21 
 
wage minimum 
wage 
wage 
Under minimum 
wage 
18,1 46,7 12,0 23,2 100 
In the tranche 
of minimum 
wage 
11,3 27,5 17,8 43,5 100 
Above 
Minimum wage 
5,9 6,9 6,3 80,9 100 
Total 8,9 16,8 8,6 65,8 100 
(1) Classification by ranges, taking rounding into account. It excludes domestic service and 
beneficiaries of employment plans 
Source: Our own elaboration based on data from the Permanent Household Survey – EPH – INDEC, 
Second quarter 
 
Chart 5. Modifications in the amount of the Universal Child Benefit ($ 
Argentine)  
Data 
Amount per child / 
pregnancy 
Amount for child with 
disability 
Decree 
November 2009 180 720 1602/09 
September 2010 220 880 1388/10 
October 2011 270  1.080 1482/11 
September 2012 340 1.200 1667/12 
June 2013 460 1.500 614/13 
Source: ANSES (National Social Security Administration) 
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Chart 6. Selected Coefficients of multinomial regressions. Dependent variable 
(DV): Employment status. Panel Data Pool 2004-2013  (1) 
 
Total salaried in t-1 
Only salaried 
registered in t-1 
On salaried not 
registered in t-1 
 
Coef. Err. Std. Coef. Err. Std. Coef. Err. Std. 
TOTAL 
DV: Salaried registered in t 
With a salary below 
the range of the 
minimum in  t-1 
-0,384 0,085 -0,309 0,141 -0,377 0,120 
With a salary in the 
range of minimum 
wage in  t-1 
-0,290 0,094 -0,023 0,146 -0,313 0,145 
DV: Unregistered salaried in t 
With a salary below 
the range of the 
minimum in  t-1 
0,215 0,087 0,744 0,168 0,005 0,101 
With a salary in the 
range of minimum 
wage in  t-1 
-0,009 0,101 0,444 0,182 -0,231 0,123 
DV: Unemployed or inactive in t  
With a salary below 
the range of the 
minimum in  t-1 
0,309 0,103 0,186 0,179 0,342 0,140 
With a salary in the 
range of minimum 
wage in  t-1 
0,011 0,118 0,280 0,182 -0,008 0,172 
 
N° de obs.: 22.364 N° de obs.17.174 N° de obs.5.190 
Men 
   
DV: Salaried registered in t 
With a salary below 
the range of the 
minimum in  t-1 
-0,398 0,102 -0,330 0,180 -0,324 0,136 
With a salary in the 
range of minimum 
wage in  t-1 
-0,268 0,114 0,074 0,182 -0,208 0,166 
DV: Unregistered salaried in t 
With a salary below 
the range of the 
minimum in  t-1 
0,176 0,100 0,795 0,209 -0,040 0,112 
With a salary in the 
range of minimum 
wage in  t-1 
0,176 0,118 0,794 0,220 -0,080 0,139 
DV: Unemployed or inactive in t  
With a salary below 
the range of the 
minimum in  t-1 
0,128 0,130 0,013 0,242 0,081 0,170 
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With a salary in the 
range of minimum 
wage in  t-1 
0,162 0,146 0,619 0,230 -0,013 0,207 
 
N° de obs.:  14.893 N° de obs.:  10.917 N° de obs.:  3.976 
WOMEN 
      
DV: Salaried registered in t 
With a salary below 
the range of the 
minimum in  t-1 
-0,308 0,160 -0,249 0,233 -0,493 0,270 
With a salary in the 
range of minimum 
wage in  t-1 
-0,423 0,171 -0,267 0,243 -0,727 0,312 
DV: Unregistered salaried in t 
With a salary below 
the range of the 
minimum in  t-1 
0,280 0,176 0,654 0,292 0,031 0,237 
With a salary in the 
range of minimum 
wage in  t-1 
-0,593 0,207 -0,398 0,345 -0,845 0,282 
DV: Unemployed or inactive in t  
With a salary below 
the range of the 
minimum in  t-1 
0,583 0,181 0,367 0,279 0,710 0,276 
With a salary in the 
range of minimum 
wage in  t-1 
-0,313 0,207 -0,285 0,301 -0,278 0,329 
 
N° de obs.: 7.471   N° de obs.:  6.257 N° de obs.: 1.214   
(1) Universe: registered and not registered salaried workers in t-1. Classification by ranges rounded 
ranges.  It excludes domestic service and beneficiaries of employment plans in t-1. 
 
Note: It is controlled by gender, age of the sample, educational level (categorized in three 
levels) position in the household, size of the establishment, type of activity, region of residency 
and for each of the waves included in the data pool.  
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Chart 7. Selected coefficients from the differences in differences models in 
multinomial regressions. Dependent variable (DV): conditions of registration.  
Cross section data corresponding to biennia between 2014 and 2013 (1)    
DV: Registration in the year after the modification of minimum wage 
(1 = non registered salaried y 0 = registered salaried) 
Coef. Err. Std. 
Biennia 2004-2005 
  
With a salary below the range of the minimum and 2005 -0,219 0,199 
With a salary in the range of the minimum and 2005 0,040 0,158 
 
N° de observations: 8.558 
Biennia 2005-2006 
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With a salary below the range of the minimum and 2006 -0,216 0,151 
With a salary in the range of the minimum and 2006 -0,005 0,178 
 
N° de observations: 9.122 
Biennia 2006-2007 
 
With a salary below the range of the minimum and 2007 -0,043 0,133 
With a salary in the range of the minimum and 2007 -0,185 0,174 
 
N° de observations: 11.028 
Biennia 2007-2008 
 
With a salary below the range of the minimum and 2008 -0,058 0,121 
With a salary in the range of the minimum and 2008 0,043 0,155 
 
N° de observations: 12.809 
Biennia 2008-2009 
 
With a salary below the range of the minimum and 2009 -0,074 0,125 
With a salary in the range of the minimum and 2009 -0,244 0,153 
 
N° de observations: 12.910 
Biennia 2009-2010 
 
With a salary below the range of the minimum and 2010 0,076 0,124 
With a salary in the range of the minimum and 2010 0,175 0,144 
 
N° de observations: 12.834 
Biennia 2010-2011 
 
With a salary below the range of the minimum and 2011 0,095 0,124 
With a salary in the range of the minimum and 2011 0,216 0,138 
 
N° de observations: 13.208 
Biennia 2011-2012 
 
With a salary below the range of the minimum and 2012 0,100 0,126 
With a salary in the range of the minimum and 2012 -0,055 0,163 
 
N° de observations: 13.348 
Biennia 2012-2013 
 
With a salary below the range of the minimum and 2013 -0,343 0,131 
With a salary in the range of the minimum and 2013 -0,229 0,171 
 
N° de observations: 13.144 
(1) Universe: salaried registered and non-registered workers. Classification by ranges, taking 
rounding into account. It excludes domestic service and those benefiting from employment 
plans. Control group: salaried workers with remunerations above the legal minimum.  
 
Note: Data is controlled by gender, age, age squared, education level (categorized in three 
levels) position in the home, size of the establishment, type of activity, region of residence and 
for each of the waves included in the data pool.  
 
Source: own elaboration 
25 
 
 
Chart 8. Selected coefficients of multinomial regressions. Dependent variable (DV): 
Employment status. Pool of data from the 2009 -2010 panel.  
Universe: Employed in  2009  
 
DV:  Unemployed DV: Inactive 
 
Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error 
TOTAL 
With UCA 0,563 0,159 0,146 0,097 
 
N° de observations: 5.033 
WOMEN 
With UCA 0,734 0,271 0,195 0,117 
 
N° de observations: 2.143 
MEN 
With UCA 0,460 0,195 -0,015 0,183 
 
N° de observations: 2.890 
Universe: Inactive in 2009 
 
DV:  Unemployed DV: Inactive 
 
Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error 
TOTAL 
With UCA 0,297 0,143 0,170 0,085 
 
N° de observations: 7.204 
WOMEN 
With UCA 0,177 0,191 0,143 0,104 
 
N° de observations: 4.545 
MEN 
With UCA 0,348 0,132 0,205 0,151 
 
N° de observations: 2.659 
 
Note: Data is controlled by gender, age, age squared, education level (categorized in three levels) 
position in the home, size of the establishment, type of activity, region of residence and for each of the 
waves included in the data pool.  
 
Source: own elaboration  
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Chart 9.  
Coefficients selected from the differences in differences models in 
multinomial regressions. Dependent Variable (DV): Employment status. 
Cross section data corresponding to the biennia between 2010 and 2013 
(1)  
 
DV: Unemployed DV: Inactive 
  Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error 
Biennia 2010-2011 
With UCA and year 2011  -0,042 0,137 -0,106 0,100 
                                                             N° of observations: 20.170 
Biennia 2011-2012 
With UCA and year 2012  0,586 0,140 0,738 0,106 
                                                             N° of observations: 19.065 
Biennia 2012-2013 
With UCA and year 2013  -0,209 0,144 -0,320 0,112 
                                                             N° of observations: 18.428 
(1). Universe: adults age 18 to 59 belonging to homes with children where there are no 
members employed in formal jobs (registered in social security). Control group: adults 
from homes that do not benefit from UCA.  
 
Note: Data controlled by gender, age, age squared, education level (categorized in 
three levels) position in the home, size of the establishment, type of activity, region of 
residence and for each of the waves included in the data pool.  
 
Source: own elaboration  
 
